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of the
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State of Utah
~-\ILEEX

WEBB,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

vs

HERBERT A.
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ERASTUS

P. SSO\V·, ANN PY:L\1~1 SNOW,
E\T.ALYN s. DEClCER AND AGNES

S. GALLACHER,
Defendants and Appellants.

)

Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County

Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to recover damages resulting from
an assault and battery ~of respondent by employes
of appellants, taking pla~ce on the property of the
giant racer operated by appellants, not on the loading platform, as appe~lla.nts state, but on the floor
of the entrance near G, shown on the drawing
appearing on page 3 of appellants' brief. As shown
on that drawing, there is no gate, fence or other
barrier bet"\\reen the stairs and the ent:r,ance between the 'ving' fences, one of which extends h~Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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t\veen 0 and P, and \vhich flank the entrance to the
loading platforms C and B, nor between the entrance and the loading· platforms themselves, nor
.any signs to keep out. (Tr. 111).' C is the west
'loading platform and B the east. The operating
platform A is about 18 inches below the loading
platforms. (Tr. 77). The black lines on the drawjug· which indicate the \Ving- fences, extend on south
to a point below the cash regis,ters sho\vn on the
op·erating plat£orm where they turn east and west
respectively to the edge of the loading platforms
abutting on the tracks .

.:\s indicated on the dra,ving and testified to by
employes of appellants, fares. are not collected fron1
passengers on the cars. which travel over the giant
race:r tracks until the passengers have been seated
on the ca.rs and a bar put in place in front of them.
(Tr. 175). On the night in question in this case
three employes of appellants collected faresi from
the passenge:rs) each one colle~cting fares from two
of the six seats making up a t~ndem of cars, three
seats to a car. On page 2 of appellants' brief it is
sta.ted· that ''The p~ayment of the admission to
Raltair did not entjt]e one to ride the racer - that
called for an additional fee, which appellee, or .any
of her party, never paid or offered to pay." Of
course, as sho"\\rn above, this is a misleadin~ and unfair statement. And, of cours,e, the public is invited to come onto appellants' racer premises.
1

Counsel for appellants keep insisting (Brief, pp.
4-5) that the cars running on the west s,et orf tracks
were sufficient to take care of the people then deRiring to ride. Yet Mr. Bettilyon testified that respondent .and her p!arty came into the entrance to
the racer and ·located about at point G in the entranrP. (Tr. 77). 1\frR. Bet.tilyon stated they waited
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at about F on the entrance platform and that there
was a crowd of people the·re and they could not get
any closer. · They waited 15 or 20 minutes,. She
further stated, "The crowd didn't seem to be. moving up very fast at all.~' ( Tr. 90-1).
The scale on the drawing· shows the loading pla.tfornt to be 48 feet long and 6% feet wide from F
and 0 to the south cross fence separating the load~ng platform from the unloading platform D and
E. Mr. Webb testified that the west platform had
a crowd backed up to about F on the drawing, (Tr.
102-3) and they could not get any nearer. Only the
cars on the w_est tracks were running. ·There was
a tandem of cars on the east tracks, standing idle.
(Tr. 103). Respondent and her p~rty never got
seats in the cars and hence_ p.aid no fares.
The evidence shows without contradiction that
Bernard L. Bettilyon and respondent are brother
and sister, and Kenneth Webb is respondent's hus . .
band, and Hope Bettilyon is the wife of Bernard L.
Bettilyon.

We will refer to Be-rnard L. as '' ~Ir. Bettilyon, ''
and· Kenneth We-bb as •'~Ir. Webb'' hereinafter.
To the writer this case had one astonishing asp~ect.
One would naturally expect that the fighting which
took place on the night in question was preceded by
curses, great anger, abuse and name-calling. Nothing of the kind took place. All the -witnesses_
agreed on that.
At .about 9 :30 in the evening Mr. Bettilyon .and
wife took the train to Saltair, ,danced two or three
times, left the dance floor about 10:30 to 10 :45;
before the 11 .o'clock intermission, met Mr. Webb
and his wife, and all four went to the racer and
stopped at point F, north of the \vest loading platSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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form, where they stayed 15 or 20 minutes waiting
·for a ride on the racer. They moved east. 'rhere
are two tandems of cars operated on the west track.
(Earl Cochran, Tr. 155 and 175-6).

Mr. Bettilyon stated he would get the boys to start
the cars on the east side. At point L he leaned on
the fence and finally one of the boys looked over
''and I asked him if they wouldn't start up the
other line of cars, and he said s,omething to the
effect that they "'Tould be starting up in a little
"'hile and there was no use hurrying and that they
\vould get it done eventually.'' ( Tr. 78).
''They were very, very nice.'' ''I asked them some
questions about the operating of the racer." ''We
bantered back and forth. I made reference to the
fact they were giving pretty lousy service, and they
laughed back and asked me what business I was in,
and did I always give good service.'' ''All very
friendly, we were laughing back and forth.''
''Eventually I said something to the effect, well,
since the~ didn't want our 1noney we had to take
lit and give it to another concession, and one of the·
boys whirled and said if I didn't like the -service
I knew what I could do, and I said yes, I guess I
knew w4at I could do. . . . he shouted to me . . . to
get the hell out of there, something like that. . . . I
believe I said 'Go jump in the· lake,' and then turned and started up to the north. . . . I was still
squatted down." (Tr~ 78-80).
''The fellow 'vho had made the remark was on platform A and he leaped across these cars and got
over here . . . and turned me: around and shoved
me back. (He used) both hands. . . . I was taken
eompletely off my feet and I immediately swung
a.nd missed him. (He) simply flew right in and
the next moment 've ''rere fighting for all we were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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both worth. . . . Immediately he was joined by two
other men from platform A . . . who started right
in on me without any provocation, raining b~ows
from every ang·le. . . . At point M three were on
me. I wanted to get out of there. In fact I didn't
want any trouble to start with. . . . I tried to ·get
out, tried -going back up ; in fact I was being backed
up (north all the time)." ((Tr. 80-2).

''I know I was grabbed several times and
held while other people hit me in the front
and back and eventually I got down to about
point 0, \Vhere I was knocked out." (Tr.
83).
Earl Cochran, the employe of app·ellantg who first
talked to Mr. Bettilyon, testified that a "Slim''
Bernard Lynch, a friend of his who did not work
there. too~ hold of !fir. Bettilyon from behind and
took him over about to 0 and that Bettilyon
wrenched loose and started to fight again and Jack
(Lamp-ere) hit him. ''That is when I hit l\Ir. Webb.
. . . After I hit him he was over here . . . between
G and F, . . . out towards the center (of the entrance platfonn)." (Tr. 151-2). ·He further testi·
fied that none of appellants' four employes got any
black eyes or bruises, and that on the previous trial
that ''There were a lot of them, I will tell you that;
there was quite -a few swinging wild around there; ·
"I know we had to take them all." (Tr. 170).
Further that Bettilyon was 'lvorking north up the
platform toward the entrance and that he (Cochran)
was not backing up. Further that on the previous
trial he testifjed, ''I 'vent across there a.nd I grabbed his hands, like this" and that he was a little
mad, (Tr. 171) although in this trial he testified
that he never touched Mr. Bettilyon until Mr. Bettilyon swung at him. (Tr. 148; Tr. 172). In the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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previous trial Cochran testified Bettilyon said,
"You come and put me over there," and he ~aid,
"I will do just that."
Mr. Bettilyon was never ordered to leave the concession. Before Earl Cochran caine across the cars
he told Mr. Bettilyon to go around to the other sidl!
where the cars were running.
Jack and John Lampere are brothers. John Lampere testified that when Earl Cochran told Mr.
Bettilyon to go around on the other side Mr. Bettilyon said, '' ''1ly don't you put me around there >'
and Earl s~aid, ·''I will do just that,'' .and ' 'my brother Jack started to go over there and I started to
go over there, and my brother took and handed me
his glasses." (Tr. 213).
Then Lynch, an outsider and a friend of Earl's;
''came into the fray.'' He ran in and grabbed Mr.
Bettilyon. ( Tr. 213¥2).
Jack Lampere testified to the s.ame effect and that
he himself asked Mr. l3ettilyon to go a:f<ound to the
other side. (1Tr. 235). He hit ~Ir. Bettilyon twice
and then hit Mr. Webb. Then he knocked Mr. Bettilyon down. (Tr. 236).
·
.Jack La.mpere said a hand came over his shoulder
and hit him in the' face -and he turned around fast
•'and hit someone and it turned out to be Mrs.
Webb." (Tr. 237).
Respondent testified that Mr. Bettilyon got up from
his crouching position at L, he called something
over· his shoulder and kept right on 'valking a'vay,
and Cochran and the Lampere brothers were
'' s'vinging at him and he wa.s s\vinging back, trying
to back up.'' (Tr. 123). "And after he (Mr. Bett ilyon) _was knocked out . . . (these men) walked
right over n1y brother and stnrt0d in, all of t.hem,
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on my husbsnd. . . . One of them knocked him to
his knees.'' ''I stepped . . . on~ or two steps and
I slapped him (Jack Lampere) and he knocked me
out." When I slapp·ed him "he was looking right
at me.'' (Tr. 124-5 ).
Mrs. Bettilyon testified as to what happened tQ
her husband, Mr. Bettilyon that ''He was knocked
out right flat on the floo,r, and the scuffle was going on all around him, and over him, and one of the
fellows sort I of kicked him out of the way.'' And
after Mr. ~·ettilyon went down, ''Well, they walked
all over him and kicked him out of the way.''
"Then I saw Mr. Webb get knocked down to his
knees.'' And ''Well, the operation was just like ·
that. Just as soon as Mr. Webb was knocked down
Mrs. Webb was knocked out.''

And
''\\nen Mr. Webb was knocked down, Mrs.
"\\..,.ebb stepped out there and said 'You
can't do that to my husband,' and she
slapped Mr. Lampere, and he just pulled
his arm back, and measured for a good one
and let go."
..t~nd when asked whether respondent was knocked
in a sitting or prone flat position,
''She ""'as p,rone; she was unconscious. She
was just stretched out on the floor, un- ·
conscious, and Mr. Webb wa.s able to get to
his feet and come over and lifted her up
to a sitting position, and he was patting
her cneeks, and that." (Tr. 94-6).
Kenneth Webb testified that after the conversation
between Bettilyon and Cochran ''He. (Bettilyon)
got up and started to walk back to where we were.''
(He had been squatting down at L). ''I irnagine he
bad taken ahout five steps, something like that,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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about that distance, when one of the fellows jumped over and turned him around, and gave him a
push, and Lou (Mr. Be,ttilyon) kind of broke away,
or gained his balance again, and swung back at
this fellow, and when that happened there was a
couple· of more fellows came up there and they all
got hold_ of Lou and I didn't really know if they
were pushing him, shoving him,-·or hitting him, but
there were fists flying.''
''Mr. Bettilyon wa.s just trying to defend hin1self
the best he could. '' ''I st~pped in between them,
and said, 'Lis,ten, you gruys, cut tha.t out; \vhat is
the idea of this, anyWay . Come on, Lou, let us
get out of here.' I took hold of Lou's arn1, to turn
him around, and at that time somebody swung a.t
me, and I ba,cked up, and I might have hit back.
I don't know; I don't even remember." (Tr. 105-6).
And "We wanted to\ get out of there, and "re kept
trying to get up here where \Ve could get out, and
we got up to ·about this point in here \vhen Lou
\vas knocked out." (Tr._ 108).
So it clearly appears:

1. That there \Vas no quarrel or harsh
or profane language preceding the melee;
2. That it cannot be said that it was a
question for the jury as to who started the
trouble.
3. That ~fr. Bettilyon never was ordered
off the premises, but only 'asked to g10
around to· the west side of the ·loading
platform.
·
4. That both Mr. Webb and Mr. Bettilyon
( reRpondent 's husband . and brother) were
down before she intervened, and that thev
'vere. in dang-er.
·
fi. That no conduct on the pa.rt of Mr. BetSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tilyon justified the conduct of Cochran and
the two Lamperes, and that Mr. Bettilyon
was not at fault, and was not the
aggressor.
6. That no conduct on anybody's part justified the assault on respondent.
7. That nir. Bettilyon started to leave the
east platforll). before Earl Cochran came
over the cars, and that he .was traveling
towards the entrance at all times, and that
C~ochran and the two Lamperes were following him right up from point L to beyond
point 0 on the entrance platform.

EXTENT OF

RESPONDE~NT'S

INJURIES

MR. BETTILYON was knocked out and did not
see respondent knocked down.
MR. WEBB testified that prior to the evening of
June 22d, at Saltair, his wife (respondent) w.a.s in
very good health; that he worked late every night,
~and that Mrs. Webb would cut the lawns and do the
watering, the housework, etc., .and that she never
complained to him of any illness o-r inability to do
her work. (Tr. 111-12), and further:

Q. Now, 'vhat has been her physical condition, as you have observed, since June
22d, how has she been around the house T
A. Well, after that time she got up Sunday morning, when we got up, and was complaining about an awful beadache, and we
thoue~ht it ""'as just a natural reaction, and
never paid much .attention to it. That
went on for a couple of weeks, and she had
nPVPr complained very much, but she alSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ways complained of a backache and headache, and often she would really have to
go lie down. It would get her to where
she couldn't stand up any longer and it
\vas about that time that \Ve had to call the
girls in from upstairs, to come down and
do some of the housework, and cook the
meals, because my wife would try, hut s.he
couldn't keep up that long to do it, and she
just went down in health, started going
down from that time on, and I really didn't
know very much about what was wrong,
but I wanted her to go to the doctor

Q. Just tell us, has she been able to perforln her hous.ehold duties as you described
them prior to June 22d with as much effi. ciency since that date in your ho1ne up to
the present time 1 .
A. No. she has not.
Q. Is she entirely well yet, as far as you
know?
A. No, she isn '( (Tr. 112-113).
MR.S. WEiBB tesJified that she had missed her
monthly period a little over two weeks before the
night in question, and that the morning after she
was knocked down :at Saltair that her neck and faep.
were .aU swollen up·, she was black and blue, her
back hurt 1to even move, 'and she had awful p~ains
in her abdomen, and severe headaches, and wa.A
nervous. The swelling in her face .and neck stayecl
three or four days, and the 'headaches were like a
pressure right around her head; it hurt worse t.o
He do"\\rn than to stand up, and that she 'vas just
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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getting" back to normal so tha.t she could go to bed
and sleep on January 30, 1941, a little- over six
months after the occurrence a.t ·Saltair.

Six days after she was knoeked down, she started
to hemorrhage, and hemorrhaged continuously up
to the 1st of January, 1941, she was so bad she could
not put her feet to the floor and the emissions were
large blood clots. CTr. 128-9). That these ·hemorrhages would last for eight or·ten days or longer,
and then cut down just a little bit, b:ut they never
stopped. She did not consult a doctor until October, 1940, when she consulted Dr. J. U. Giesy, and
he gave her electrical treatments every other day
up to the time of trial in January, 1941. She was
not able at the time of the trial to do all the work
and things about the house she used to do. (Tr
129.-30).

On cross-examination res.pondent said she did not
learn of her condition until some time in November,
and that her doctor did not tell her anythin.g at
first, and that after she finally got· her doctor's
opinion, she went to her. attorney, and he said· ·he
would not make a new complaint until he had tallrP-d
to the doctor. She talked to her attorney some.
time in November. (Tr. 138-9).

DR. J. U. GIESIY, a physician and surgeon, testified that he examined respondent on October 2,
1940. and found her to be in a_ weakened physical
condition, an anemic condition, and somewhat in anervous condition; he found a large, congested,
and disp~laced uterus, the mouth of the uterus he
found n1ore open than normal,. and tender through
the pelvic region ; he further testified as follows :
Q.

From that examination of the

uteru~
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could you tell whether .or not there had been
any loss of blood J~
A. 1 could do so, for the simple reason
that loss of blood was manifested by the
blood conditions indicating loss of blood,
and by the fact that there was oozing of
blood still continuing ..
Q. Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in this case
had passed her regular menstrual period by about
two weeks, and that on June 22·, 1940, she was struck
1a blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit down
violently, or to fall down on her back, and that some
five or six days thereafter she suffered a severe
vaginal hemorrhage, accompanied by large and
numerous blood clots, and that she thereafter so
suffered and continued to suffer hemorrhages and
blood flow and clots for ten days or two weeks
thereafter1 and that after that she continued to
hemorrhage up until approxhnately January 1,
1941: Taking all of these facts, as I have just given
them to you, together with your personal diagnosis
and examination of the patient on o.ctober 22nd, together with )'iOur personal knowledge· and experience in the field of medicine, what is your professional opinion as to whether or not on June 22, 1940,
Mrs. W P.bb was or 'vas not pre·~ant ~
•

MR. JTJDD: We· object to that as incompetent
and immaterial to the issues of this case, and that
the facts. are not sufficiently stated to warrant a
conr.lusion : warrant the (doctor in finding the conclusion. th.at is necessary.
THE COURT: In what resp,ect are they deficient?
MR.•JlTDD: In that we think from those fa.cts he
~annort determine that. she "ra~ pre~nant.
THE COUR,T: He may he, of course, of a differ0nt opinion.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. JUDD : vVell, I am making my record, your
Honor.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
A. Will Y<>'u state the question briefly
Q. The question is, taking all the facts as
I have recited them to you, together with
your personal diagnosis and examination of
the plaintiff on October 22, 1940, tog1ether
with your personal kn-o,vledge of and experience in medicine, what is your professional opinion, as a doctor, as to whether
or not on June 22, 1940, Mrs. Webb was or
was not pregnant~
MR. JlTDD: May our objection stand to the question as re-stated, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes; and overruled.
A. In my professional opinion Mrs. Webb
""as pregnant on the 22ri.d of June, 1940.

Q. Doctor, if in your op·inion as you have
just stated it, that on June 22nd the plaintiff was pregnant, would, in your professional opinion, would a blow sufficiently
violent to propel her to the floor be sufficient to cause her ·a miscarriage?
~fR.

JUDD: I object to that .as incompetent and
immaterial, and not sufficiently stating the facts .
to warrant the conclusion called for.

THE COURT:

The objeetion is overruled. An-

~wer.

A. In my opinion, yes.

Q. Doctor, would the injuries described
hy any such patient to you on O·ctober 2:?,
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1940, coupled with your personal examination of her, which occurred on that san1e
date, I ask you:~ would the injuries described by her on the evening of June 22, 1940,
coup,led with y;our examination and your
diagnosis be sufficient to cause a miscarriage~

A.

Yes.

Q. Doctor, if in your medical opinion that
patient, the plaintiff herein, was pregnant
on June 22, 1940, would a severe hemorrha,ge and issuance o.f blood five or six
days thereafter, continuing for a period of
ten days or two weeks thereafter constitute a miscarriage - taking the facts as
I have related them to you in the first
hypothetical question I asked you, and
assuming she had missed her menstrual
period for two weeks prior~
A. Answering the a.ssun1ption that Mrs ..
Webb 'vas pregnant on the 22nd of June,
1940, the answer would be ''Yes.''
Q. Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in
this ease, Mrs. Webb, was pregnant and in
a normal state of health on June 22, 1940,
hut assuming that on that date she was
struck a blow of sufficient violence to cause
her to sit down vioJently, or to £all p·rone
on her hack, and having your opinion that
t h P fact~ just related might be sufficient
to ~ause a vaginal hemorrhage, I ask you,
i~ it your pr.orfessional op~inion that said
hemorrha~e, vaginal hemorrhage, might
r.ontinue for a period of four or five months
nftPr the da,te on which the blow was struck
nnd wi~h lesser intensity, or would that
I
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hemorrhage continue, ·might that hemorrhage continue at intervals 1
A. Under the hypothetical assumption
then, hemorrhage in such a case which had
resulted in a ·miscarriage might continue,
more probably, through a period of months
at intervals after the initial hemorrhage
following or accompanying the direct miscarnage.
Q. Now, during this period of time you
pave seen her, did your personal examination of her on those occasions from Octobe·r
22nd to about the Christmas holidays reveal. to you that she was still suffering
hemorrhages¥
·
A. At interv~als, ~Ir. Brady.
Q. What has her condition been the !last
two times you have seen her these last two
months, her physical condition?
A. Between December and January she
had quite a definite hemorrhage. Since
then there has beep no pronounced or visible bleeding, as far as I have any information on the subject.
Q. That hemorrhage condition you speak
of occurred as late as the Christmas holidays?
A. Somewhat later.
Q. What is her condition today, or as of .
the last time you exa,mined her?

A.

There is an improvement.

Q. Would you sav that she is now a well,
healthy woman T
A. No.
I I
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Q. How much time do you anticipate with
the treatment y;ou are giving_ her, it will
take before she is once again a. ,normal,
healthy woman~
A. Frankly, Mr. Brady, I imag·ine the
active local treatments. are about ended. It
may take a little time to return her physical tone.
Q.

Would that be by natural processes or
by medicinal processes~
A. Well, it would be largely by natura.!
proeess~es. Some of it might be due to some
medicinal treatment, if it v\"as found advisabl~.

Q. N O\V, one further question.
You
spoke about the displacement of the uterus.
Would you explain that a little more in detail to the jury, what you found, and "rhat
your opinion is as to what caused that displacement, and how it \vas dispJaced ~
A. Well, there are several types of displacement of the 11terus. In this particular
cas.e the uterus was, as \Ve say retroverted,
that is, tipped back. It \Vasn 't bent, whicl1
me.ans it \Vould he a retroflexion. It was
tipped definitely backwards, or retroverted. In my opinion, that retroversion
has been cause4 by a uterus ·\vhich had suffered, and- well, suffered from the effects
of what I had already found to be a miscarriage, and had never returned to normal
sjze, a condition in medicine that is known
as a uterus which has become enlarged for
~om~ rea.Ron or other, and has not returned
to its normal size, in which there ""as a
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~\Yollen,

enlarged condition of the uterine
organ. An organ of that kind somewhat
enl~rged and ~onle\vhat ove·r weighted so
that its s\vollen condition may easily, upon
sudden or sharp exertion or lifting, or anything of that kind, become disp~laced, and
generally it "Till displace backwards.

Q. Could that dispJaeement, as you have
described it to the court and jury, be caused
in itself by an applic;ation of superior
force, is that a medical possibility'
A. Oh, there is a medical possibility of
the uterus being displaced backwards, and
some othe·r direction, by certain motions of
force, yes.

Q. Doctor, in your medical

op~nion,

would
thP misearriage .and hemorrhages which
you have described have any effect on th€\
patient's nervous system~
A. You see, in my opinion, in this particular case this displacement of the uterus
followed probably a miscarriage, and was
more due to the miscarriage than it was to
anything else - now, any shock or violenc«'
such as \Yas narrated to me in this case, I
having no personal knowledge of it, except
hears.ay~ as regards the actual incident
which occurred, any severe shock of th.at
kind will have· a more or less unbalancing
effect on a p.erson 's nervous system, I believe. In other words, any gudden shock,
any sudden injury, I think medical authority will sustain me in stating1 that it always
results in what we call a nervous shock,
in a grenter .or less degree.
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DR. E. L. SKIDM:ORE,_ a physician and surgeon
produc.ed as a witness by .appellants, testified that
pregnancy and miscarriage might account for respondent's physical troubles (Tr. 201); he made no
physical examination of her (Tr. 203).

He furthe:r testified as follows ·
Q. Assuming that on the evening in question, on the 22nd of .June, 1940, l\lrs. VV ebb
was struck a blow by the fist of a man, and
she was propelled violently to the floor at
the plaee she was standing, and was knocked wholly unconscious for some consi~er
able period of time, that later she 'vas revived and escorted to her automobile, with
help, and that she went home, and five or
six da.ys thereafter she hs.d nausea in the
stomach; she had severe harkaches; the
side of her £ace was swollen and bruised;
she suffered severe headaches, and five or
six vaginal hemorrhages, accompanied by
large clots of blood, ·for ten or fourteen
days there.after: Would that state of facts,
Doctor, enable you to venture .an opinion
as to whether or not this hemorrhage, these
hemorrhages that she- suffered were as a resPlt. of the h1o,vR inflicted upon her'

1\fR. JUDD:

I object to that, your Honor, as in-

competent and immaterial, a statement of fact, including a number of facts which are not in evidence.

THE COURT:

For instanc.e, point out the spe-

tific facts.

MR,. JlTDD: 'Vell, that she was -

I don't know,
there were so many .- if you can read it, I will
tpoint out. There were so many words used there
aR a. speech that were not in ller tr-stimony at all.
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MR. BRAD,iY: It is a statement of f,act, and no
speech was intended. You have made a challenge
that 'Ye haven't put the facts in.
MR. JUDD: ''Violently to the floor,'' there is. no
evidence· of that. There is no evidence she was
knocked wholly unconscious for some considerable
time. That is absolutely false, because her husband
said he went to her and he s.at her up and patted
her cheeks and she came' to, and he lifted her up
and took her over onto a bench.
MR. BRADY: Your own witness testified he saw
them go down underneath the pavilion and she was
escorted down there.
MR.. JUDD: I have made my objection, and pointed out, and I can continue to point out.
THE COURT: The objection may be overruled.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes what'
A. That is the .answer
Q. From those facts you would s,ay she
might have been p~re·gnant ~
_A. Yes .
Q. And might have had a miscarriage.~
A. Possibly.

'ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS' THEORY

Counsel reiterates on page 22 of appellants' brief
the statement that the appellee and her· party at
the time of the altercation, or subs,equent thereto,
never had offered to pay or p.aid the required fee
for a ride .on the racer. As clearly appears from
the record, r~ference to which is made in our StatPSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment of Facts earlier in this brief, no fee is paid to
ride on the racer until the passenger is seated in a
car and the bar placed in front of the seat. whereupon the emp:loyes collecrt just hefoTe the ca.r is dispatched over the Tacer. This statement is manifestly unfair and misleading. They further state on
the same page that lVIr. Bettilyon was the leader of
the party and that "following his approximately
four hours at a highball convention in the N e"\vhouse
Hotel that he was. at Saltair to do foolish and uncalled-for things for the amusement of his party;
that in going down on the east side he was at a
point where he had no right to be."
It appears from the evidence that he had been at a
20-30 Club convention at the Newhouse Hotel from
3 :30 to about 7 :30 p. m., and that he had had six or
seven cocktails at the most during that period of
time, that after the convention was over he drove
his car home, with a friend as a passenger, had
supper and left the house and proceeded to go to
the depot and then to Saltair, and that they l1ad
nothing to dri~..k after the convention. (.Tr. 72-4).
Here agnin we ha:ve counsel s·aying th~t he was at
Saltair to do foolish and uncalled-for things for
the amusement of his party, an ob¥iously unfair
and unjustified statement.
It clearly appears from the dra-\ving and from the
testimony that there were two platforms for passengers at the giant racer. Counsel states that Mr.
Bettilyon was at a point where he had no right to
he, and that app·ellants' ''boys,'' after several times
inviting him to leave, were fully within their rightR
in going over to him to try to induce him to go
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around "There he would not eause them trouble in
the operation of the racer .

.

Of course, the racer was a resort concession and
soliciting the public to patronize it, and the public
\Yas invited to come upon the raceT 's concession and
ride the cars on the ra.cer. Counsel say that for
him to be where he was ''created a consta.nt hazard
to the safety of the racer operation because it
diverted the attention of the boys from their work;
that when they invited him to leave and he did not,
he became a trespasser and was subject to removaL''
The evidence shows that Mr. Bettilyon never was
invited or asked to leave the concession, that everything was pleasant and agreeable until he said they
apparently did n.ort want his money, and they would
spend it on some other con.cession, whereupon Earl
<Jochran and the others went into action for thP
purpose stated by Earl c·ochran as hereinbefore set
forth of ''taking them.'' lTnder all the evidence,
all that Cochran ever did was to a,sk Bettilyon to go
over to the otheir side where the cars "\Vere then running_ and never to leave the concession. I wonder
what counsel thinks Mr. Be~ttilyon should have done
,vhen ~Ir. Cochran, after saying, "I will do just
that,'' came leaping over the course on the east side
'in pursuit of Mr. Bettilyon, who was w.alking back
to the entrance~ When respondent slapped Jack
Lampere, her brother wa.s knocked out, lying- on
the floor, and, as she testified, "ras being kicked out
of. the way, and her husband hRd been knocked to
his knees. It seems p·erfectly clear that the alarm
Rhe said she felt as to. their danger 'vas natural and
~nstiffpif.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR HAVlNG TO DO
WITH PREGNANCY AND MISQARRIAGE
On p·age 24 of their brief, eounsel take up assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2, the first being an ohjection as to the question asked respondent as. to
whether she could tell the court whether or not she
was pregnant on the evening· in question. Of course,
·she was not competent to testify to that fact. She
did not testify to the fact either one way or the
other. In response to the question she said, ''I
had , missed my p·eriod before, mornthly period, a
little over two weeks. '' So that the ruling of the
court, overruling the objection, was entirely harmless. And, of course, the motion to strike .her answer above set forth was, properly denied.
We have no quarrel with the statement that the
question of whether or not she was pregnant is one
of science and must be determined by the testimony
of skilled, professional persons. In the second
Oklahoma ease cited by appellants, the two physicians who testifie.d on behalf of plaintiff testified
against her, and the court p·rop·erly held that to
sustain her theory that the distention of. her bladder
caus.ed the stitches to tear, and that the tearing of
the stitches caused the bladder to fall. was untenable unless she had competent medical testimony to
support it. In the third Oklahoma case cited by
couns.el, the o"nly evidenc;e in behalf of the claimant
was his testimony that he was gassed and that that
cauRed his disability. No skilled '\\itnes.s supported that claim.
A.S TO PREGNANCY AND

MISCA~RIAGE

Rtarting on na.~e 27 0f' their brief, appellants assert
that re-spondent failed to produce eVidence tending
to support her claim that as a result of. the injuries
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inflicted upon her by the assault and battery that
she suffered a miscarriage and lost her unborn
child. Appellants requested the court to instruct
the jury that there was no substantial evidence that
respondent was pregnant at the time of the alleged
assault and battery.
\"\Te have set out heretofore the testimony of Dr.
Giesy produced by respondent, and Dr. Skidmore·,
produced by appellants, and it seems clea.r that
under their evidence there was ample testimony to
justify the submitting of the question of whether
respondent suffered a miscarriage to the jury. Dr.
Giesy test~fied positively as hereinbefore set forth
under the heading, ''Extent of Respo'ndent 's Injuries," that in his opinion respondent was pregnant at the time of the assault and battery, and Dr.
Skidmore stated that he could not say that she was
not. Dr. Giesy, of course, was in a position to give
a competent opinion because of his knowledge of
her condition and his examination -and treatment
of her, and the condition of her pe~lvic region. B·oth
doctors testified that a blow sufficiently violent to
propel respondent to- the floor would be sufficient
to cause a miscarriage.

In the Louisiana case., cited on pag~e 29 of ap·pel·
]ants' brief, the court s-aid that it was not in the
slightest deg1ree convinced that the '' sligfut accit
dent'' described had anything to do with the abortion in question, and that in a matter of serious import to itself the court would not act on it. The
court's belief as to the facts in a ]a,v suit have no
place in a case in Utah. Louis.iana is a civil law
State. A judge in Utah 'vould l1ave no power to
~n bstitute his . opinion as to what the Pvidence
~bowed for the opinion ()f competent medical P.X'PP.rts. In the seeond T_joui.~iana ea~e ritPo on page
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32 by appellants, it appeared that one doctor s.aid
he did not know whether the trouble suffered by
the claimant could possibly have 'been caused by a
blow and that he would not know whether it was a
probability in the case, and that the other doctor
'rho had treated claimant for two and one-half years
gave no opinion
In the Kentucky case cited by appellants on page 33,
the Court held that they could not agree with the
contention that the miscarriage was not shown to
have been the direct result of the collision.
In the Michigan case cited· on pag:e 35, the Court
stated that the evidence .did not disclose evidentiary
facts, and that the exp•ert had but a theory that plaintiff was sterile becaus.e she did not become pregn.ant, and that probative evidence must be sornething more tangib~e than a me~e pyramiding of
theories. In the instant case) there is positive testimony by Dr. Giesy that in his opinion respondent
·was preg1nant at the time of the blow and that a
miscarriage resulted from the blow.
In the Maryland case cited on page 35, the Court
said:
''The plaintiff has failed in this ease to
meet this burden of proof. The testimony
of the doctor, whom she called, is clearly
to the effect that there is no natural and
reas,.onable con11ection het\veen the accident
of February 12~ and the plaintiff's illness
and operation of July 3. Nor is this connection sho"rn by any other testimony on
the record. Conjecture, speculation, or
1nere possibility, must not usurp the place
of proof of the Pssential facts in issue if
the trial of facts is to remain a rational and
1usf prnrrilure. ''
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.A.SSIGNMENTS 0'1~' ERROR BASED ON ADnllSSION OF EVIDENCE UNDE·R CROS:SEX.A.I\fiNATION
The question was as follows:
'' N o"T, you have described those dutie1s you
have in connection with the collection of
fares. Is acting as a bouncer for the ejection or eviction of people that you think
should be evicted, also a p.art of your
duties~"
(Tr. 160).
On pag"e 38 of appellants' brief, counsel say:
''This statement, first, is an op·en attemp~t
on the p·art of counsel to embarrass ·the
witness befo.re the jury in that counsel
injects into the picture a rough situation
such as a bar-room or the like, where the
'bouncer' is a required pa,rt of the equipn1ent.

''Second. it assumes that appellants maintained such a place and that a 'bouncer'
"'"as necessary and that this boy was of
such a character, that he would act as a
bouncer.
''Third, the statement assumes that as
such 'bouncer' he could eject or evict people whom he thought ought to be thrown
out regardless of who they were or what
they were doing.
j

''There 'va.s no evidence in the record
which would warranf any inferenee that
app·ellants employed anyone to act as
bouncer in and about the giant racer, and
particularly that this witness was employed for any such purpose. Neither iR thPre
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anything in the record that the appellants
employed anyone to eject or evict people
that they 'think should be evicted,' or that
this particular witness was so employed.
The record shows upon its face that the
sole and only reason for asking this question was to prejudice the mind of the jury
against the app.ellants.''
First, let us see. what the· witness thought about
vrhen he was permitted to answe·r the ques,tion:

y·

A. I don't suppose so. If they don't 'vell, if. they don't go we ha.ve - it was
ne·ver told us to do it, hut we supposed we
always had to. (Tr. 160) .
.In the 1928 edition of Funk & W agnail's New
Standard Dietionary of the English Language, on
page 317, we find the following definition:
"Bouncer . . . ( 5) (Slang, U. S.). A person employed to eject disorderly pe~rsons,
as from a hotel or restaurant."
So, there is no question but the word "bouncer,"
is a recognized term in __..\.merican nomenclature,
and it is clearly apparent from the· answer of the
.witness that the witness thoroughly understood it,
and that he did act a.s a bouncer.
·
'

The argument of counsel really js. ridiculous. The
witness had stated his duties at the request of
counsel for app·ella.nts, and he· went on properly
enough and testified that acting as a bouncer he
~upposed was a part of such duties.
Counsel say that . the record shows upon its face
that the sole and only reason for asking this question was to prejudice the mind of the jury against
appellants. The thing that decided the jury against
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the appellants 'Yas the rough and uncouth antics
of appellants' employes on the night in question.
Pursuing the absurdity further, we might ask when
is a bouncer not a bouncer~ And the answer would
be, that whe·n employes whose duty it is to se~at
passengers at a public concession in cars, fasten
them in, and collect fares, leave their plac.e of employment and abandon their duties in order to go
out and start a roug~h house among the passengers
"Taiting to patronize the concession. The cases
cited by appellants are clearly not in point.
In the Idaho case, a question was asked a witness
implying that suits "rere instituted against the husband of the respondent in that case, because of his
financial condition and her extravagance. The
Court said that there was no evidenee on which to
base any such ~assumption as the question did.
In the Maryland case, the court ·refused to permit
a witness to be asked on cross-examination if he did
not live at his mother's home with the woman he
married, before he married her. The Court held
that such testimony was entirely collateral, and did
11ot bear in any way on the c.redihility of the witness, and could have no purpose save to degrade
and humiliate him.
J n the Indiana cas.e, the objection to a quP-stion was
sustained on the ground that it assumed facts not
covered by the direct testimony of the witness. The
Court held that the ques.tion assumed facts as to
\vhich there was no evidence.
On pag1e 41 of their brief, appellants say that the
question asked Mr. Cochran, and above .quoted,
assumed that there was s.ome duty upon the appellants which did not exist either as a matter of law
or as shown by the facts. Counsel i~ore the fact
that tl1e witness had testified to the fact HR _to his
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duties upon their examination, and that the question to which they object merely sought to elicit
information as to whether or not there were additional dutie,s.
The Alabama case cited on page 41 involved a
question asked a witness who was in a car but not
driving it whether he knew, a.s a driver of a car,
that it was his duty to keep to the right when turning a corner, and the court held that the question
assumed· the existence of a duty not prescribed by
statute nor ordinance. On page 42 of their brief,
counsel for appellants arg)ue their objections to the
·hypothetical questions propounded to Drs. Giesy
and Skidmore on the gTound that the questions contain .s,tatements . of fact which were not supported.
by the evidenc'e and that the facts \\7 ere colored and
exaggerated to the extent that they were mis1
.
.. ead1ng.
Under _the heading· hereinbefore of ''Extent of Respondent's Injuries,'' we have set forth the questions, as well as all of the evidence, with res,pect to
respondent's condition, and in the "Statement of
Facts'' at the start of this brief, we have set forth
the testimony with respect to the assault and battery, and it clearly appears that competent evidence was adduced justifying every element included in the questions to which appellants object.
If it was an exaggeration of the evidence to include
in the hypothetical questions that respondent was
struck a blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit
down violently, or that she was propelled violently
to the floor, we certainly must confess an .ignorance
of what violently meanR.
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ASSIGNlVIENTS OF ERRO·R BASED UPON
REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUOTIONS.
Be~nning on page 43. of their brief, appellants discuss the failure of the court to give the instructions
requested by then1.

R.equest No. 3 in effect would, if given, have submitted to the jury the question of whether or not
Jack Lampere used unnecessary force in knocking
respondent down, and would have instructed the
jury in the first sentence thereof that the plaintiff
(respondent here) attacked him, and that he was
protecting himself, and would only leave ·to the
jury the question of whether or not he exercised his
judgment unreason~ably ''in his own defense.''
There 'vas a dispute in the evidence. Respondent
testified that Lampere was looking directly at her
\Vhen she slapp:ed him, and that he then struck her
and knocked her out. Lampere wa.s the only witness who testified that his back was turned and that
respondent struck him from behind, and that he
iurned around and struck before he kne'v that it
was a woman who had slapped him. This requested
instruction assumes as a fact that Lampere was attacked by re·spondent. and v\ra.s defending himself
and th·a.t the slap administered to him by respondent was unjustified.
·
From. our Statement of Facts heretofore in this
brief, this Court 'vill observe tha.t respondent testified that Jack Lamper~ knocked her brother out,
and that (these men) walked right o:ver him and
started in on her husband, and one of them. knocked
him to his knees and that she stepped onP or two
steps and slapped Jack I~a.mpere, and hP knocked
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Jler out, and that when she slapperd him he was look..
ing right at her. (Tr. 124-5).
The instruction requested is erroneous in assuming
a disputed question of fact as a fact, in assuming
that Jack I.Jampere was in the right, when . he
knocked respondent's {brother out and knocked her
husband to his knees just before he excha~ged
blows with respondent, (which he testified he did),
and that Mr. Bettilyon wa.s in the wrong, because· if
Jvlr. Bettilyon was in the right, of course' respond.;.
ent had a right to intervene when· he was knocked
down and her hushand was knocked to his knees.
Ther~ can be no question but that she was justified
in intervening to prevent more injuries to her hus~
band or her brother, or both. She testified that
they 'vere kicking her; brother out of the way to
carry on the fight. ·
The same is true as to Requests Nos. 4 ·and 6.
As stated in the closing of the Statement. of Facts
hereinbefore, it clearly ·appe.ars from the evidence
that no conduct on the part of Mr. Bettilyon justi•
fied 'the conduct of Cochran and the two Lampe res,
.and that Mr. Bettilyon was not at fault, and wa.~ not
the ag1gressor) and that Mr. Bettilyon started to·
]eave the east platform before E-arl Cochran came
ove·r the cars with the avowed purpose of putting
Bettilyon over on· the west platform, .and that Mr.·
Rettilyon was travelling north toward the entrance
~at all times, and that Cochran and the two Lamperes
'vere follo,ving him right up from point L to beyond·
point 0 Qn the di~gram on page 3 of appellants'
hrief, and that no conduct on anybody's part justifjed .Tack I_jampere's assault on respondent, so that
neither of the requested instructions were pertinent
to the is.sues of the case.
On p.ag.e. 47 of their brief, appellants request the
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tilyon had no right to go on the east side of the
racer platform when only the west side was being
operated, and that appellants' se,rvants ''in their
operation of the racer had a lawful right to use such
reasonable force as was necessary after requesting Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part of defendants' property, to remove him from the place
in question,'' and that '' if in using force to remove
said Bernard L. Bettilyon that he attempted to or
did start to fight or hit the servant or servants of
defendants and as a result of such assault or attempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon was
later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's
husband voluntarily came into the fight and that
later this plaintiff herself left a place of safety and
slapped defendants' employe1e in the face, as a result of which plaintiff was struck by said employee,
then plaintiff cannot recover in this case and your
verdict will be for the defendants,, and each of them,
'no cause of action'. ''

Counsel state ·that the.1requested instruction cleaJ"..
ly states their theory of the case. The reason the
requeRted instruction was not given was that the
theory is untenable. Appellants were operating a
public concession at a resort. The entrance and
hoth the east and west platforms were thrown open
to thn public. Counsel assumes that regardless of
the invitation to the public and the fact that re·
spondent and her companions were at the racer to
patroniz(:l! it, that because Bettilyon went over on
the east platform and asked to have the cars on the
east side started in operation so as to take care of
the crowd 'that appellants' employes harl the right
to order him to the west platform and to uRe force
to remove him to the west platform and to over(~ome any resistance to their manhandli11g that RPt
tilyon put forth.
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'rhere are no cases in the books 'vhich justify such
conduct on the part of employes at a public conces ..
sion which the public is invited to ·visit, so how can
appellants p~roperly say that Bettilyon was in the
wrong, and' that therefore respondent has no remedy~
And certainly, under the evidence of re . .
spondent that her brother was knocked out and that
her husband was knocked to hia knees, and that
these employes were kicking her brother out- of the
way, it cannot be said that there was not -sufficient
justification for her interference! Bear in mindthat respondent's husband was trying to stop the
employes of appellants from further attacking
Bettilyon, and trying' to assist him in getting away.
Counsel, of course, take the position that there was
evidence that Bettilyon was in the wrong, and also
that respondent had no right to inte~rvene.
The cases cited by appellants are not in point, as
the facts in this c-ase do not justify the submission
of any such issue as s.aid requested instructions
would have injected into the case.
On page 51· of their brief, in Requested Instruction
No. 7, appellants requested the court to charge· the
jury that Bettilyon had no right to he on the east
platform, and that if he refused to leave the east
side when requested hy appellants' servants, in ef. .
feet that the·y had the rig1ht to use any reasonable
force that was necessary to remove him, and that
Bettilyon had no right to resist. In other words,
they ask the court to instruct the jury that Bettilyon was a trespasser after he was asked to go to
the west platform and did not do so, and that the
enRujng as~.anlts by appellants' em-ployes on Bettilyon, on Webb and on respondent were perfectly
-proper.
\Vhere did the right of these b·ouncers originate!
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handle and bea.t up people who came to the racer
concession at the invitation of appellants?

On page 52, in Requested Instruction No. 8, appellants asked the court to instruct the jury that the
owner of the premises ''may rightfully restrict the
use of his premises to his business guests . . . ''
and that ''if a business gues.t refus.es to quit a re~
stricted portion of the premises after verbal request
so to do and reasonable opportunity has been given
him to depart, he ther6by beco.mes ·a trespasser and
may be ejected by the use of such reasonable force
a_s is necessary under the circumstances."
And counsel quote authority to the effect that
reasonable force ntay be used to prevent' a trespass
or to eject a trespasser or intruder.
iCounsel cites on page 53 a Utah case holding that
ihe occupant of pemises has the legal right to adInit whom he pleases and to exp'e'l anyone who
abuses the privilege thus given him. The case doe-s
hold that one who abuses the privilege and is asked
to depart and fails to do s.o becomes a trespasser,
.and the o'vner is justified in using reasonable force
to eject him. There was no order for Bettilyon to
leave ·the premises by anyone. He had abused no
privilege, and all the evidence is to the effect that
because he failed to heed the capricious orders of
appellants' bounce·rs to .f}'O to another part of their
premises, they had the right to forcibly eject him.
As heretofore stated~ th{ltre is. no authority, in our
opinion, which supports counsel's contention.
On page 54 of their brief, appellants theorize tha.t
before respondent intervened in defense of her brother and husband, the fracas had come to an end.
They. call attention to the fact that one Bernard
(Slim) I.Jynch,· not. a.n e·mploye orf appellants and an
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outsider, grabbed Bettilyon by the arms and told
him ''that he had better get out'' and that he,
Lynch, proceeded to edect him and that Bettilyon
got loose.
Can there be any question but what this was merely a continuation of the unjustified conduct of app·ellants' employes in attempting to move Bettilyon
from one platform to the other~ Can it be said
when the evidence shows by the testimony of appellants' own witnesses ~hat Bettilyon was constantly
moving north toward the entrance, and that Cochran and the Lamp·ere brothers were constantly following him up while he \vas backing and travelling
north and trying, not as counsel would have you
:believe to move him to the west platform, but to
beat him up and brutalize him, that Bettilyon was
the aggressor at any time~ He was properly resisting a manhandling by Cochran to begin with,
and trying to prevent being beat up by Cochran
and the Lampe~re brothers from then 01;1. If employes of a concession, inviting1 the public to· patronize if and visit it, can justify conduct such as there
was on the night in question, we had better have a
.new set of la,vs to protect the public from thugs
·employed by concessio111 owners, because a ruling
that their conduct on the n_ight in question meets
with the approv;al of the law would prQhably precipitate an era of assaults by con.cession e1nployes
~ho could find any excuse to demonstrate their
fistic and roughhouse ability on concession patrons.
In this conn~ction, this Court \vill observe from
the evidence that ·an three of appellants' employes
--.vere big, strong fellows, any one of them superior
in size and build to 1\f r. Bettilyon; and that while
B·ettilyon was knocked out, VvT ebb was knocked to
hisSponsored
knees
and respondent 'v~s knocked out, not one
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of these employe~ got a bruise.

Each one, so

testified.
The trouble with appellants' theorl.e~ as to the
issues in the case ""as and is, that thev are untenable, and that under the evidence the gi.ving of their
requested instructions " . ould have confused and
misled the jury, and would have invited a miscarriag·e of justice.

E R RO R·S BASED UPO·N
GIVEN.

INSTRUCTIONS;

On page 58, counsel· complain of the court's Instruction No. 4, that respondent was a guest at
Saltair that night, a.nd had a right to remain there
as long as said resort remained open to the public
that evening.
Counsel assume in their argument that the instruction was that they were guests on the racer, regardless of their actions. Of course it is admitted
that respondent and her companions were paid
guests a.t Saltair. They had hee~n dancing and can1e
down to have a ride on the racer. Is there anything
in the evidence which would make it improper or
harmful for the court to instruct the jury that they
were guests at Saltair Beach ~nd entitled to remain
there that eYening~ Saltair Beach \Vas not a party
to the suit. What pr~judice could there b~ front
such an instruction~ To make the question harmful, th~re would have to be evidence that respondent
and her companions were requested to leave Salta.ir
Beach for some reas.on. The racer \Vas a. concession operated separately from the resort by
appellants.
On page 60 of their brief, counsel say the court
erred in giving~ Instruction No. 5, by "'"hieh thP
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court told the jury that if they found from the evidence that respondent was apprehensive that her
husband and brother, or e~ither of them, were in
danger of bodily harm, and that she interceded in
the affray to protect either or both, that she was
justified, and that if they further found from the
evidence that she 'vas rendered unconscious, by a
blow from one of app·ellants' employes, the mere
fact that she participated in the affray would not
bar her ~rom recovering· damag,es.
Certainly it is a question for the jury as to whether
;her husband and brother were in danger, and that
!Ssue wa.s properly submitted.
\Counsel's objections to that instruction, and the
instruction numbered 6, which stated that a p~erson
is justified in using sufficient force to prevent a
consummation of injury as a result of apparent
danger to fa~ly members rais.ed the question involved in their theories of the case. If the Court
is of the opinion, and we think the evidence. would
justify no other opinion, that app·ellants' employes
were in the wrong and that respondent's husband
and brother or either were in danger, then appellants' whole theory is untenable. In other words,
if the court was justified in refusing appellants' requested instructions, then. the instructions as given
on thes.e points \Vere entirely prope;r. VV e think the
fact is clear and undis.puted that respondent's hus·band and brother were being unlawfully and unjustifiably assaulted and battered. If the Court
can say that Bettilyon w.as ·in the wrong-, then of
course appellants~ theory would have been p·roper
for submission to the jury. But where is the evidence to the effect that Bettilyon was wrong at any
time, or 'vas the aggres~or at any time 1
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On the general proposition a.s to the rights and
duties of a person assaulted, we call the Court's
attention to
4 ~m. Juris., Published in 1936, Section 47.
Page 151, where it is said:
''The ancient doctrine which makes it the
duty of a person assaulted to 'retreat to
the wall' before he is justified in rep.elling
force by force has been generally modified
in the United States. The rule no'v generally accepted, is that one who is assailed
may meet force with force without retreating, so long· a.s. he uses. only such force a~
is necessary, even though he might with
absolute safety avoid the threatened injury
or bodily hann by retreating.''
Our contention, of cours.e, is that Cochran h·ad no
right to attempt to move Bettilyon from the ea~t to
the west platform, and that his racing across the
ears from the working platform to the east loading
platform, and either attempting to strike o~r grab
hold of Bettilyon constituted an assault, an attempted assault and battery, or an assault and
hattery. What would couns.el requir~ Bettilyon to
do when Cochran, after saying, ''I will do just that,''
when Bettilyon said why don't you put me a.round
there, rushed, as he s.aid he did, across. the cars and
·at Bettilyon? It is clear that he either intended to
:attempt to move Bettilyon around to the west platform or commit a battPry· on him, and all Bettilyon
did at any time was to protect himself. According
to the testimony, not only the three employes of
appellants, but Slim I~ynch, an outsider, eomn1itted
nss.aults and hnttrries on Bettilyon.
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'rhere is no question about respondent's
recover damag·es for her actual injuries,
sequent pain and suffering as a result of
sonal injuries, including a. miscarriage,
damage to her clothing.

right to
the conthe perand the

\"1,T e are unable to find any authority which v;ould

justify the awarding of damages to the respondent
for the loss of her unborn child. The jury must
have believed that a miscarriage resulted fron1 the
battery committed on the respondent, and in vie"\\·
of this fact, "\Ve do not believe the verdict to have
been excessive, even if the element of dan1ages, fo1~
ihe loss of the unborn child "\Vere elhninated; but,
of course, the jury were entitled to take that into
consideration under the instructions, and we must
assume that some portion of the damages. awarded
by the jury represented the loss of the unborn child.
The case is unquestionably one of liability, and the
personal injuries, and the resulting disability and
1niscarriage of course would justify a verdict for a
sum as large as respondent recovered.
The only suggestion we can make to avoid the
necessity for a new trial is that this Court give the
respondent the option to accept a reduction in the
amount orf the damages recovere-d to an amount to
be fixed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

RAYMOND R. BRADY
JOSEPH R. HAAS,

AND

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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